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"BENEFITS AND COSTS OF A VARIABLE OIL IMPORT FEE" 
Introduction 
The sharp decline in real world oil prices since 1986 has had a 
significant impact on the U.S. economy, moderating the rate of inflation and 
reducing energy costs of consumers and businesses while creating widespread 
unemployment, bankruptcies and bank failures across the oil-producing states 
of the Southwest. Combined with record federal budget and trade deficits, 
these severe regional dislocations have rekindled the debate over an increase 
in the (currently very small) U.S. oil import tariff. The most frequently 
suggested forms such an increase would take is either that of a fixed fee of 
$5 or $10 per barrel (such as Representative Gephardt's proposal) or a variable 
fee set equal to the difference between the world oil price and a guaranteed 
minimum domestic price of $22 - $24 per barrel (as recently suggested by 
Governor Clements of Texas). 
Advocates of higher oil import fees have advanced a number of 
rationalizations for such a policy. Interested politicians and indust:ry 
spokesman point out that new oil import fees would reinvigorate the domestic 
petroleum industry and help to lower massive trade and federal budget deficits 
while reducing our dependence on insecure foreign oil. 
By encouraging higher domestic production and promoting domestic 
conservation of oil and other fuels a higher oil import fee would help to 
reduce the percentage of U.S. oil demand being met by foreign suppliers. 
However , the enormous costs that would be associat:ed with permanentl y closing 
our borders to all foreign energy supplies suggests that full "independence" 
from foreign energy sources is unlikely to ever be achieved. Imposing a new 
oil import fee would advance this elusive goal, but unless the higher prices 
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stimulated domestic reserve replacement at least as much as production, doing 
so would amount to a so-called "drain America first" policy. 1 
Thus, the view that new oil import fees would contribute to the reduction 
of the U.S. trade imbalance initially appears plausible. As the cost of 
imported crude oil for U.S. refineries rose under the tariff, the volume of 
oil imports would fall, with fewer dollars flowing out of the U.S. as a result. 
However, there would be some negative impacts of the fee on the trade balance 
as well. Higher domestic energy prices would reduce U.S. firms' competitiveness 
in the production and sale of energy-intensive goods, both here and abroad. 
U.S. exports could soften at the same time that U.S. imports are being 
stimulated by relatively cheaper foreign goods. Additionally, oil exporting 
nations may decide to impose retaliatory tariffs that would further reduce 
U.S. exports. 
From a different prospective, others (such as Broadman and Hogan (1986)) 
argue that a new (fixed) oil import fee is needed to internalize the social 
costs of foreign oil not perceived by private importers, independent of any 
industry assistance it might offer. A variable oil import fee (VOIF) has 
been advocated (see Singer (1986)) as a way to accomplish many of these ends 
while also insulating the U.S. economy from the costly capital adjustments 
associated with widely fluctuating oil prices, since it would attenuate 
downside risk in energy-related investments. 2 Al though more difficult to 
administer than a fixed fee, a VOIF would disappear as world oil prices rose 
above the guaranteed floor. Thus, a VOIF could be more politically palatable 
as a protectionist measure than a fixed fee, but would become ineffective as 
a tool for internalizing the security premium on imported oil at higher 
prices. 
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Reasoning that a VOIF is the most likely form an increase in the U.S. 
oil import fee would take, this study assesses the benefits and costs of a 
VOIF that puts a floor of $23 per barrel (1986 dollars) under the domestic 
oil price. 3 Assuming such a VOIF is imposed in 1988, domestic petroleum 
supply and demand impacts are forecasted through 1995 and used to estimate 
the gross effects on federal revenues and the U.S. balance of trade over 
this period. Finally, we forecast the likely impacts on U.S. real GNP levels 
and social welfare and then draw some tentative conclusions on the net effect 
of a VOIF on the U.S. economy. 
An Engineering-Based Econometric Model of Petroleum Production 
A dynamic, engineering-based econometric model of petroleum production 
in the State of Texas (see Jones and Bremmer (1987)) is used here to project 
the full domestic oil supply response. In brief, the model is based upon an 
econometric form of the exponential decline curve widely used in the petrolewn 
engineering literature to model crude oil production by both primary and 
secondary methods and nonassociated natural gas production. 
For both crude oil and nonassociated gas, production tends to decline 
exponentially over time as the reserve base is depleted, but the observed 
rate of decline is modelled as a function of the opposing forces of reserve 
and well abandonment. The rate of reserve replacement is in turn modelled 
by a system of econometric drilling equations that are ultimately driven by 
the expected profitability of new drilling prospects. The rate of well 
abandonment depends upon the profitability of the marginal well and the size 
distribution of production across the well population. Both measures of 
profitability depend upon the net prices received by producers after paying 
all applicable taxes, drilling costs, and operating expenses. 
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To complete the model, crude oil production resulting from the application 
of tertiary, or enhanced oil recovery (EOR) methods is modelled separately 
from conventional crude production in Texas. EOR methods have contributed 
little to aggregate U.S. oil production thus far, but are expected to be 
increasingly important in coming years as primary and secondary production 
declines. Not included in the retrospective analysis of Jones and Bremmer, 
this EOR oil supply equation is based upon projections of U.S. EOR activity 
made by the National Petroleum Council (1984): 
(1) 
~ t-1 + L.. i=l o:1 (t-i) (NPOi+l - NPOi) + '7t 
where NPOt represents the real net price per barrel of EOR oil after paying 
all production taxes, including the federal windfall profit tax (WPT), and 
'7t is a random error term. The coefficients a
0 
and o:1 are in turn specified 
to be quadratic functions in time, reflecting the NPC's projections of rising 
and then falling EOR oil production under alternative constant real price paths. 
Estimation of (1) was accomplished using OLS on the NPC data, yielding 
the following results: 
a
0
(t) = 120.963 - l6.242t + 0.289t 2 
n = 114 
(2.71) (2.63) (1.56) 
1.326 + l.457t 
(0.75) (6.26) 
0. 037t 2 
(5.42) 
R2 = o.921 
where the t- statistics for the null hypothesis that the parameter's true 
value is equal to zero are given in parentheses. 
Finally, implied year-end Texas oil and gas reserve levels are calculated 
as: last year's reserves plus new reserve additions minus current production. 
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Domestic Petroleum Supply Impacts 
The Texas petroleum supply model described above was used to project 
the annual changes in Texas oil production through 1995 that would result from 
the imposition of a variable oil import fee in 1988, calculated as the 
difference between the assumed world oil price and a domestic price floor of 
$23 per barrel (in constant 1986 dollars). 
The assumed paths of real world oil prices and real domestic gas prices 
used in these simulations were taken from the DOE's Base Case scenario in 
its Annual Energv Outlook 1986 (AE086). When simulating with the import 
fee, real world oil prices were assumed to remain unchanged, 'While real domestic 
gas prices were assumed to rise to 70 percent of the BTU equivalent price 
of oil. 4 Table 1 lists the prices used in the Base Case and fee simulations 
for 1988-1995. Once the Base Case prices rose above the floor ($23 per barrel 
for oil, $2. 90 per MCF for gas) , they were assumed to prevail in the fee 
simulation. 
As Table 2 shows, the projected increases in Texas oil production from 
a VOIF would be modest, peaking at 4.5 percent in 1990 and averaging 3.7 
percent over the eight-year period covered by the simulations. In terms of 
average daily production rates, Texas would supply around 80,000 extra barrels 
per day (bpd) over the first four years under the fee, falling to less than 
50,000 additional bpd by 1995. A~though the fee becomes dormant after 1993, 
the lagged nature of the price response embodied in the model projects higher 
oil production levels in subsequent years. 
Further evidence of this lagged price response shows up in the higher 
projected level of Texas oil reserves as of year end 1995,---which would rise 
by over 2 percent, or 133.7 million barrels, as a result of the fee. Thus, 
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our analysis suggests that, at least in the case of Texas, worries that an 
oil import fee increase would help to "drain America first" may be misplaced. 
Higher domestic oil prices could stimulate reserve additions more than 
extraction, causing U.S. petroleum reserve levels to rise rather than fall. 
Based upon Texas' historical shares of U.S. oil production levels, the 
Texas oil supply impacts from a VOIF were converted to national impacts, 
assuming an equiproportionate response. 5 A guaranteed minimum domestic 
price floor of $23 per barrel would stimulate as much as 426,300 additional 
barrels of U.S. oil production per day by 1990 under our assumptions. By 
1995, the U.S. oil supply response would be down to just under 290,000 bpd, 
averaging about 350,000 bpd over the entire eight-year period. As Table 2 
also shows, our results compare favorably with the DOE's projections of an 
additional 440,000 barrels of U.S. oil production per day over the same period 
under a roughly equivalent price floor of $22 in 1985 dollars but assuming a 
lower world oil price scenario. Interestingly, although these annual estimates 
were derived in entirely different manners, they follow very similar 
patterns--peaking in 1990 and declining thereafter. 
Domestic Petroleum Demand ImDacts 
In addition to stimulating domestic petroleum production, the higher 
real domestic oil prices caused by a VOIF would reduce domestic consumption 
of crude oil. This effect would be felt in two ways: first, through the 
usual impact of a higher price on quantity demanded, and second through any 
negative impact that higher oil prices might have on real U.S. GNP, which 
would shift the U.S. oil demand curve to the left. 
The annual impacts of the VOIF on U.S. oil demand were projected using 
a partial adjustment or "habits persistence" oil demand equation of the form 
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suggested by Daly, Griffin & Steele (1982) which imposes a geometric lag on 
the price response and an instantaneous response to changes in real GNP. 
Using the lag operator L, the oil demand equation can be written as 
(2) ln Oil demandt - fio + (fi1 /(l->..L)) ln Oil pricet + fi2 ln GNPt 
where both the oil price and GNP levels are measured in 1982 dollars. 
Eliminating the lag operator yields a nonlinear estimating equation of the form: 
(3) ln Oil demandt fio* + ,81 ln Oil pricet + p2 ln GNPt - fi2 >.. ln GNPt-i 
+ >.. ln oil demand t-l + ct 
where the error term ct is assumed to be serially independent (an assumption 
that is substantiated in the estimation which follows). In this form, (31 
represents the short-run or instantaneous response in oil demand to changes 
in the real oil price, while ,81 /(1->..) captures the long-run oil price 
elasticity. The instantaneous GNP elasticity is given by fi2 • The value of 
>.. indicates the speed of adjustment in oil demand to price changes, which 
should be rather slow to allow sufficient time for the stock of energy-using 
capital to turn over. The higher the value of>.., the slower the adjustment 
to price changes. For example, if>..= 0.9, approximately two-thirds of the 
full price response will occur within 10 years after the price change. 
Estimation of (3) was accomplished vi.a nonlinear least squares on annual 
observations from 1969-1986. The values of the estimated coefficients and 
their standard errors are given in Table 3. The short-run oil price elasticity 
of demand is estimated to be only -0. 06 while the GNP elasticity is estimated 
to be very near unity (0. 97); both estimates are strongly statistically 
significant. The fairly large and statistically significant estimate of the 
speed of adjustment parameter>.. (0.96), implies a rather slow adjustment to 
price changes. The long-run price elasticity of demand, calculated as -0.06/(1-
.96), is well above unity at -1.40, reflecting this long lag in response. 
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The assumption of serial independence of the error terms in equation 
(3) appears to be justified in this case. The value of Durbin's h test 
statistic of 1.343 is too small to reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation. Finally, the high value for iP of O. 942 obtained by this 
specification suggests that it would be well suited for forecasting future 
U.S. oil demand. 
Using the estimated form of (3), we first projected annual U.S. oil 
demand assuming base case values of real oil prices and real U.S. GNP levels 
(in 1982 dollars, both taken from AE086), and then again under the fee case 
assumptions. The impacts of higher real oil prices on annual real GNP levels 
in the fee case simulation were calculated using a constant elasticity of 
real GNP to real oil prices of -0.021 as estimated by Darby (1982). 6 These 
GNP impacts are discussed in more detail below in connection with the welfare 
costs of a VOIF. 
Table 4 gives the projected annual U.S. oil demand impacts from 1988 
through 1995, both in thousand barrels per day and as percentages of base 
case consumption. The reductions in average daily U.S. oil consumption levels 
start out substantial--over half a million bpd in 1988--and grow even larger 
very quickly. By 1991, the conservation gains have more than doubled to 
over l. 1 million bpd, or 6. 3 percent of base case consumption. Over the 
eight-year simulation period the annual average reduction in oil consumption 
due to the VOIF is estimated at 979,800 bpd, an annual drop of 5.6 percent. 7 
Balance of Trade Imnacts 
In the past six years the United States has experienced an unprecedented 
deterioration in its international trade position. The U.S.__balance on current 
account has turned from a $6 billion dollar surplus in 1981 to a deficit of 
nearly $150 billion in 1987. The deficit of U.S. real net exports of goods 
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and services was equivalent to more than 4 percent of real GNP in 1986 - the 
largest deficit in post-war history. The deterioration between 1981 and 
1986 was the result of a worsening of the U.S. trade balance in 9 of the 10 
major product groups used to classify international trade. 8 Thus, one 
potentially favorable effect of a VOIF is the contribution it could make 
toward reducing such large U.S. trade deficits. 
As mentioned earlier, a VOIF would affect the trade balance in several 
competing ways. Clearly, as Table 4 showed, as the fee increased the cost 
of imported crude the U.S. consumption of foreign oil would decline. A 
reduction in the volume of oil imported by this U.S. would directly (although 
temporarily) improve the U.S. trade account. However, the deleterious effects 
must also be considered. A smaller quantity of U.S. dollars circulating abroad 
as a result of the decline in the U.S. demand for foreign oil will bring 
about exchange rate adjustments, making the dollar increase in value vis a 
vis foreign currencies so that American made goods will become more expensive. 
Additionally, higher oil import fees will raise domestic manufacturers' costs 
of production to the extent that their products or production processes are 
energy intensive. As U.S. goods and services become more expensive, the 
posit:ve effect of a VOIF on the trade balance would be dampened. Finally, 
if oil producing nations retaliated by imposing tariffs on U.S. goods, U.S. 
exports would be further depressed and any beneficial trade effects reduced 
a correspondingly greater extent. 
The projected impacts of a VOIF on the U.S. trade balance from 1988-
1995 are shown in Table 5. Estimates for changes in the net oil import bill 
are based upon the assumed path of world oil prices through 1995 shown in 
Table 1 and the sum of reductions of U.S. demand for imported oil (from Table 
4) and increases in domestic production of oil (from Table 2). 
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Our projections indicate that a VOIF which sets the domestic price of 
oil at $23 per barrel (1986 dollars) would lower U.S. oil imports by an annual 
average of 1,330,500 bpd, or 15.4 percent through 1995. The cumulatiye 
reduction in the U.S. net import bill would be $81 billion over this period, 
with a present value of $63. 8 billion in 1987 when discounting at a real 
rate of 5 percent. However, the annual reductions in the U.S. net oil import 
bill range from only $5 billion in 1988 to $12.8 billion in 1995. Even if 
there is no further deterioration in the other internationally traded product 
groups, this improvement in the trade deficit would be rather small relative 
to the size of recent current account deficits. 
Federal Revenue Impacts 
Another of the popular rationales behind a significant increase in the 
U.S. oil import fee is that it would provide a new source of federal revenues 
to help reduce our annual budgetary shortfalls. As Table 6 shows, a VOIF of 
the type considered above would, under our assumptions, .generate additional 
gross federal revenues of almost $62 billion (1986 dollars) over the next 
eight years, for a present value in 1987 of $54.7 billion (again discounted 
at a 5 percent real rate). Projected annual gross revenues from a VOIF would 
be $17.2 billion in 1988, falling slowly to $9.7 billion by 1991 before dropping 
off sharply as the fee becomes dormant in 1994. 
Several caveats apply when looking at these gross revenues estimates. 
First, the projected amount of the variable fee per barrel depends crucially 
upon the path of world oil prices, which, for simplicity's sake, we assumed 
would remain unchanged from the DOE Base Case values. Clearly, under higher 
(lower) world oil prices the actual gross fee receipts would be lower (higher) 
than those presented here. Secondly, should there be special exemptions 
from the fee for selected foreign oil producers (e.g., Mexico) or domestic 
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exporters of refined petrolewn products, our projections of gross revenues 
would have to be revised downwards. Finally, the net impact of a VOIF on 
federal income revenue levels would probably be lower than the gross impacts 
of Table 6 since fee- included increases in domestic energy costs could 
negatively impact U.S. GNP levels and hence, reduce aggregate taxable income. 
The Joint Committee on Taxation recently estimated (1987, p.62) the net revenue 
effect of a similar VOIF (establishing a $24 nominal price floor, with no 
exemptions) to be an increase of $15.7 billion (current dollars) in 1988, 
$9.7 billion in 1989 and $8.7 billion in 1990, or roughly three-quarters of 
our projections over the same period. 
Welfare and GNP Effects 
The preceding sections of this paper quantify the likely benefits of a 
VOIF to the U.S. economy. The primary costs resulting from a VOIF would 
involve changes in net social welfare and possible reductions in real U.S. 
GNP levels. 
A straightforward static analysis of the annual changes in net social 
welfare was obtained by summing the annual changes in consumer surplus (ti 
oil demanded* ti oil price due to fee+ 2) and the annual additional production 
costs expended domestically for oil that could be obtained more cheaply abroad 
(~ oil produced* ti oil price due to fee+ 2). Following this methodology, 
we project a very modest cumulative projected welfare loss of less than $5.4 
billion, with a present value of $4.7 billion (in 1986 dollars, using a 5 
percent real discount rate). 
The other significant component of the costs engendered by a VOIF is 
the impact on U.S. real GNP levels. These real GNP losse-s were estima~ed 
earlier in order to project the U.S. oil demand impacts of Table 4, using 
Darby's oil price elasticity of GNP of -0.021 and the percentage changes in 
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oil prices shown in Table 1 (i.e., % ~ in GNP - (-0.021) *%~in oil price 
due to fee). These annual real GNP losses were converted from percentage 
changes to absolute 1986 dollar losses using the real GNP projections found 
in the DOE's Base Case scenario of AE086, disappearing as expected 1994 when 
world oil prices rise above the floor. From 1988 to 1995, cumulative real 
GNP losses totaled $131.4 billion, with a present value (discounted at 5 
percent) in 1987 of $116.6 billion, or about 2.5 percent of real GNP in 1986. 
Summary and Policv Implications 
This study began by using an econometric model of petroleum production 
in the State of Texas to project the Texas oil supply effects when a VOIF is 
implemented in 1988 that establishes a guaranteed minimum domestic price floor 
of $23 per barrel (1986 dollars). Assuming an equiproportionate national 
response, the corresponding U.S. oil supply response would average 350,000 
additional bpd over the eight-year simulation period 1987-1995, or less 4 
percent per year. 
The annual impacts on U.S. consumption of petroleum products caused by 
a VOIF were projected by simulating with a partial adjustment oil demand 
equation estimated over the period 1969-1986. Over our eight-year simulation 
period the annual average reduction in oil consumption was projected to be 
979,800 bpd, or 5.6 percent per year. 
The balance of trade effects of a VOIF were calculated as the sum of 
the annual reductions in U.S. oil consumption and increases in domestic oil 
production, assuming world oil prices follow the Base Case path projected by 
the DOE. We found that U.S. oil imports would fall by an average of 1,330,500 
bpd each year (about 15.4 percent), lowering the U.S. net-import bill by a 
total of $81 billion. Similarly, our simulation indicates the federal 
government could expect to collect almost $62 billion in additional gross 
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revenues from a VOIF over the next eight years. Annual gross fee revenues 
would decline from more than $17 billion in 1988 to slightly below $1 billion 
in 1993 and disappear as the fee became dormant in 1994 and 1995. 
The most direct benefits of a VOIF would probably occur within the domestic 
petroleum producing regions. Although integrated multinational oil companies 
would see an increase in the cost of bringing their own foreign crude to the 
U.S. for refining, the regional employment and income effects of a VOIF would 
undoubtedly be positive. Additionally, the stimulus to the economies of oil 
producing states would generate substantial tax revenues to state governments, 
and reduce federal income maintenance expenditures in those areas. 
As recent debates among those seeking the Presidency in 1988 have pointed 
out, new oil import fees would have an uneven incidence on domestic industries, 
regions, and taxpayers. The disparate geographic distribution of oil-intensive 
industries and significant regional differences in home heating fuel usage 
would mean a disproportionate sharing of the burden of any new oil fee across 
the states and a corresponding re-distribution of income from consumers to 
producers. 9 
Clearly, a VOIF is not a painless way of reducing the budget deficit, 
improving the trade deficit, or revitalizing the domestic petroleum industry. 
The likelihood of foreign oil producing nations implementing retaliatory 
tariffs is difficult to predict, but to the extent they are imposed on U.S. 
goods, U.S. production and employment will be adversely affected. Similarly, 
any retaliatory increase in the world oil price reduce the level of expected 
tariff revenues, but would be less likely to occur since recent OPEC behavior 
suggests that it may not be wealth-maximizing to push oil-Prices higher at 
this point in time. 
Assessing the net gains or losses to the U.S. economy on a cumulative, 
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present value basis, the VOIF described herein might reduce the U.S. trade 
deficit and federal budget deficit over the next eight years by as much as 
$118.5 billion, incurring real GNP losses of $116.6 billion and social welfare 
losses of at least $4.7 billion. Thus, at best, a VOIF would generate a 
cumulative net loss of $2. 8 billion. However, this modest net loss could 
turn out to be even larger if the actual net federal VOIF revenues are only 
three-quarters as large as the gross revenues projected in Table 6, as we 
think they might be . 
In summary, a comparison of the relatively small contributions we have 
projected that a VOIF would make towards reducing the federal budget deficit 
and the U.S. trade deficit with the probable losses in social welfare and 
real GNP, suggest that arguments for the imposition of a new variable fee on 
imported oil must rely on other rationales. For example, a VOIF might 
realistically be sold as a relatively low-cost way to assist the hard-hit 
oil producing States, while providing some measure of security against oil 
supply disruptions and insulating the economy against the adjustments that 
would be caused by temporary oil price "free falls." Quantification of these 
less tangible benefits would also be a promising topic for further research. 10 
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NOTES 
1. Reasoning similarly, any policy designed to discourage domestic production 
could be classified as a "drain OPEC first" strategy. In either case, 
it should be kept in mind that recoverable reserves are economic variables , 
rising and falling with prices, rather than fixed physical stocks. 
Whether the level of recoverable reserves in the U.S. would rise or 
fall under a new oil import fee is an empirical issue that we address 
below for the case of a variable fee. 
2. In a recent "Letter to the Editor" of The Wall Street Journal (Jan . 26, 
1988, p.37) the Director and Associate Director of the Center for 
Enterprising at Southern Methodist University in Dallas argue that a 
variable oil import fee of $18 a barrel" would appear to be the most 
appropriate vehicle for mitigating price fluctuations and stabilizing 
the domestic exploration and production industry while imposing minimal 
burdens on businesses and consumers." 
3. A price floor of $23 per barrel was selected as representative of the 
wide range of minimum domestic oil prices currently being proposed. In 
its recent report to the President on Energy Security. the U.S. Departme n t 
of Energy (DOE 1987) analyzed a $22 price floor in 1985 dollars--
essentially the same as our fee. However , their study assumed a much 
lower oil price path than we use in the analysis which follows, and 
thus offers a benchmark for comparison with our results. 
4. Determining the impact of a VOIF on world oil prices and domestic gas 
prices is problematic. While any drop in U.S oil imports would reduce 
world demand for oil and tend to depress world oil prices, oil-exporting 
countries might choose to reduce their supply enough to forestall any 
price decline, possibly raising the price up to the floor. We chose to 
assume no change in world oil prices as a benchmark case, encouraged in 
part by the DOE's conclusion in its study that world oil prices would 
5. 
be little affected over the long run by a variable oil import fee (1987 , 
p.D-19). The assumption that domestic gas prices would rise to 70 perc en t 
of the BTU equivalent price was based on an analysis by Milton Russell 
(1983, p.10). 
Annual 
levels 
U.S. oil production levels (QUS) are related to Texas oil production 
·n . t ~ n 
(Qt) according to the formula: Q = Q /0 , where O is Texas' t t t t 
share of aggregate U.S. oil production during year t. Values of et for 
1988-1995 were projected from a simple linear trend model, estimated 
via OLS over the period 1978-1987: 
" 
et= o.328 - o.o09t 
(0.003) (0.001) 
R2 - o.969 
S . E.- 0.005 
where the standard errors are given in parentheses. 
Projecting U.S. oil production impacts in this way implicitly assumes a 
unitary elasticity of U.S. oil production with respect to Texas oil 
NOTES(continued) 
production. A log-linear regression analysis over the same period (1978-
1987) produced an estimate of this elasticity that was not statistically 
different from unity (estimated value - 0.745, standard error - 0.21), 
supporting our assumption of an equiproportionate response. 
The corresponding impact of the VOIF on U.S. aggregate oil reserves is 
unlikely to be nearly as equiproportional as the impact on daily production 
levels, and so is not pursued here. 
6. This was the same way that the DOE tackled the thorny issue of real GNP 
impacts in its study, so we are indebted to them for the suggestion 
(p. C-9). For their simulations, Broadrnan and Hogan assumed a considerably 
larger GNP price elasticity of -0.05. It should be noted that the impact 
of a new oil import fee on U.S. GNP may differ from that of an increase 
in world oil prices because a fee generates an intra-U.S. transfer from 
U.S. consumers to the U.S. government, rather than to foreign producers. 
Thus, either elasticity may be an overstatement of the true impact. A 
more ambitious analysis would involve the use of a large scale 
macroeconomic model to estimate the GNP effect, clearly beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
7. Since the estimated oil price impacts on real GNP may be overstated, we 
re-ran these demand projections assuming no price-induced change in 
real GNP. The results were virtually the same, with an annual average 
reduction of 912,800 bpd or 5.2 percent. Hence, almost all of the 
reductions in oil demand can be attributed to higher oil prices alone. 
8. Interestingly, the only product group that showed an improvement was 
the mineral fuels and lubricants sector, primarily due to the worldwide 
softening in energy prices over this period. 
9. Of course, differing regional impacts and re-distributions of income 
have accompanied the imposition of the federal WPT and most other energ y 
related taxation and regulations, including federal restrictions on 
fuel use and uniform emission standards for coal fired power plants. 
10. Broadman and Hogan estimate the security-related benefits that a socially 
optimal fixed import fee would provide, and the recent DOE study estimates 
about $3 billion (1985 dollars) in security and macroeconomic adjustment 
benefits from a $22 price floor, but only for the year 1995, when a 
hypothetical oil supply disruption is assumed to occur. Either calculation 
depends crucially on the probability of unanticipated disruptions, which 
is not easily estimated. 
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Table 1. Projected Domestic Oil and Gas Prices, 1988-1995 
Oil (1986$/bbl.) Gas (1986$/MCF) a 
Base With Percent Base With Percent 
Year Case b Fee Change Case Fee Change 
1988 16.18 23.00 +42.2 2.14 2.90 +35.5 
1989 16.99 23.00 +35.4 2.28 2.90 +27.2 
1990 17.84 23.00 +28.9 2.43 2.90 +19.3 
1991 19.33 23.00 +19.0 2.68 2.90 + 8.2 
1992 20 . 93 23 . 00 + 9.9 2.94 2.94 
1993 22.68 23.00 + 1.4 3.24 3.24 
1994 24.57 24.57 3.57 3.57 
1995 26.61 26.61 3.93 3.93 
a Seventy percent of the full BTU-equivalent price of oil, calculated as 
(0.70)(0.18)(oil price in $/barrel), using the DOE's BTU conversion factor 
from oil to gas of 0.18 barrels of oil= 1 thousand cubic feet (MCF) of ga s. 
b According to U.S. Department of Energy's Annual Energy Outlook 1986, Table 
A8, p.37, for 1988-1990 and 1995. Prices for 1991-1994 obtained by 
interpolation. 
Table 2. Projected Oil Supply Impacts from a Variable Oil Import Fee, 
1988-1995 (thousand barrels per day) 
Texas U.S. Oil Production 
Year Oil Production Present Study DOE (1987) a 
1988 +76.7 (3. 6)b +340.8 +410.0 
1989 +83.6 (4.0) +386.8 +520.0 
1990 +88.2 (4.5) +426.3 +590.0 
1991 +81. 6 (4.3) +414.5 +540.0 
1992 +70.1 (3.9) +373.2 +490.0 
1993 +52.3 (3.0) +294.0 +380.0 
1994 +47.7 (2.8) +282.2 +370.0 
1995 +46.0 (2 . 8) +287.7 +220.0 
Annual 
average +68.2 (3.7) +350.7 +440.0 
As of year end 1995: 
- Texas oil reserves + 133.7 million barrels (+2.2%)b 
a See Table B-3, p.D-26 in U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Security: A 
Report to the President. 
b Percent change relative to base case projections. 
Table 3. Nonlinear Least Squares Estimation Results for U.S. Oil Demand 
E uation 
Coefficient 
,\ 
R2 - o.942 
D.'W. - 1.378 
Estimated Value 
0.233 
0.958a 
S.E. = 0.020 
Durbin's h ~ 1.343b 
a 
Statistically significant at the 1 percent error level. 
Standard Error 
0.131 
0.010 
0.192 
0.044 
n = 18 
b 
Unable to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. 
Table 4. Projected U.S. Oil Demand Impacts from a Variable Oil Import Fee, 
1988-1995 (thousand barrels per day) 
Year Average Daily Oil Consumption 
1988 - 517.7 
1989 - 788.6 
1990 -1015.5 
1991 -1136.4 
1992 -1169.1 
1993 -1112.9 
1994 -1070.1 
1995 -1028 . 4 
Annual Average - 979.8 
a Relative to base case projections. 
a 
Percent Change 
- 3.0 
- 4.5 
- 5.6 
- 6.2 
- 6.3 
- 5.9 
- 5.6 
- 5.4 
- 5.6 
Table 5. Projected Trade Balance Effects of a Variable Oil Import Fee, 
1988-1995 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
-World Oil Price 
( 1986 $/bbl.) 
16.18 
16.99 
17.84 
19.33 
20.93 
22.68 
24.57 
26.61 
Annual Average 
Total 
Present value in 1987 
(5% real discount rate) 
a 
b 
Thousand barrels per day. 
Billions of 1986 dollars. 
Change in Net 
Oil Imports a 
- 858.5(-ll.1%)c 
-1175.4(-14.9%) 
-1441. 8 ( -16. 8%) 
-1550.9(-17.7%) 
-1542.3(-16.9%) 
-1406.9(-15.5%) 
-1352.3(-15.2%) 
-1316.1(-15.1%) 
-1330.5(-15.4%) 
C 
Percent change relative to base case projections. 
Change in Net 
Oil Import Billb 
- 5.1 
- 7.3 
- 9. 4 
-10.9 
-11.8 
-11. 6 
-12.1 
-12.8 
-81. 0 
-63.8 
Table 6. Projected Gross Federal Revenues from a Variable Oil Import Fee, 
1988-1995 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Total 
Present value in 1987 
(5% real discount rate) 
Variable Fee 
(1986$/bbl.) 
6.82 
6 . 01 
5.16 
3 . 67 
2.07 
0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
Gross Fee Revenues 
(billion 1986 $) 
17.2 
14.8 
13.5 
9.7 
5 . 7 
0.9 
0.0 
0.0 
61. 8 
54.7 
